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Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc.: Plumbing the Depths of the Right
of Publicity
by CAME GOLDSTEIN*
I
Introduction
A relatively new legal right, the right of publicity is a victim of
its age.' Despite the fact that it has been defined with surprising
consistency as comprising a person's right in the use of his name,
2
likeness,3 activities,4 or personal characteristics,5 courts are still
struggling with its scope and definition.6 As one legal commen-
tary noted, there is currently no consistent test for determining
how far the right of publicity extends:
The language of some courts would suggest that virtually any rec-
ognizable attribute would be protected. But a number of other de-
cisions have refused to extend the right of publicity nearly as far.
As a result, the extent to which a person's attributes are protected
by the right of publicity remains unclear.7
This confusion and lack of predictability has serious first
amendment implications. If interpreted too broadly, the right of
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (real name); Gardella
v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937) (stagenarme).
3. See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (likeness); Mc-
Queen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488, 161 S.E.2d 63, rev'd on other grounds, 224 Ga. 420, 162
S.E.2d 313 (1968) (likeness).
4. See, e.g., Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 212 A.2d 458 (1967) (indi-
vidual achievements); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (ac-
tual performance).
5. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d
661 (1977) (band leader's gestures as identifying characteristics).
6. E.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379,280 N.W.2d 129 (1979) (is the
right of publicity a property right or a personal right?); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal.
App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959) (is the right of publicity devisable?); see generally Felcher
& Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J.
1577 (1979) (discussing the confusion between right of privacy and right of publicity and
suggesting the abandonment of the terms "privacy" and "publicity").
7. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1590.
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publicity may impair the free exercise of rights guaranteed by the
first amendment.' The boundaries of the right of publicity must
be clearly drawn and a consistent method of analyzing right of
publicity cases must be adopted by the courts if we are to foster
the goals of the right of publicity without running afoul of first
amendment freedoms.
A recent court of appeals decision, Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc.,9 exemplifies the need for reform. In this
case, the court gave protection to "Here's Johnny," a phrase popu-
larly associated with entertainer Johnny Carson, under the right
of publicity.'0 Such an extension of the right of publicity is un-
precedented and undesirable.
After a brief overview of the right of publicity, this note exam-
ines and critiques the court's analysis in Carson. Then, drawing
from established principles of copyright law, it suggests a new
method of analysis that is more protective of first amendment
freedoms. Finally, such analysis is applied to the facts of Carson.
II
The Right of Publicity: An Overview
Direct recognition of the right of publicity first came in Haelen
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.," a case in which
the question of whether an exclusive contract right to photograph
a person was legally cognizable was at issue. In holding that such
right was legally cognizable, the court stated, "[W]e think that, in
addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy.., a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph ... the right
8. See Hoffman, Limitations on Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 111
(1980).
[Wihen enforced, ... the right of publicity may conflict with both the defendant's
and the public's right of free expression in a number of ways. First the right of
publicity can inhibit free expression .... Second, reports and commentaries on
the thoughts and conduct of public and prominent persons [could] be subject to
censorship under the guise of preventing the dissipation of the publicity value of a
person's identity ....
Id. at 125. See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1594 ("[ilt is generally held that First
Amendment rights require 'breathing space,' and uncertainty about the legal standards
that control these rights is regarded as having a 'chilling effect' on freedom of expression").
But see Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 527, 549 (1976) ("right of publicity is not a restriction on free speech
because material that is the object of the right's protection is thoroughly commercial, be-
yond the reach of the first amendment").
9. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
10. Id. at 832.
11. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture."' 2 This
language laid the foundation for the development of a right of
publicity. In 1954, Melville Nimmer wrote the seminal article ad-
vocating judicial recognition of this new right,13 and by the 1970's,
judicial recognition of the right of publicity had been granted in a
substantial number of jurisdictions. 14
The theory underlying the right of publicity is that a celebrity's
identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the ce-
lebrity has a protectible interest in that identity. 5 There are
three primary policy justifications for protecting that interest.'6
First, the right of publicity vindicates the economic interests of
celebrities, enabling those whose achievements have "imbued
their identities with pecuniary value"' 7 to profit from their fame.'"
Second, the right of publicity fosters the production of intellectual
and creative works by providing the financial incentive for indi-
viduals to expend the time and resources necessary to produce
them. 9 Finally, the right of publicity serves societal interests by
preventing what is regarded by our legal tradition as wrongful
conduct: unjust enrichment and deceptive trade practices.20
The boundaries of the right of publicity are unclear. Though
the right of publicity is routinely defined as comprising an individ-
ual's exclusive right to use his name, likeness, or personal charac-
teristics, there is little consensus as to what this definition
12. Id. at 868. Prior to Haelen, public personalities often attempted to use a right of
privacy theory to protect their name, photograph, likeness, etc., but were generally unsuc-
cessful. See generally Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203
(1954).
13. Nimmer, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, New York); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures Co., 70 Cal. App. 552 (1977); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231-34, 351 N.E.2d 454, 458-60 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S.
502 (1977) (Ohio).
15. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d
956 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
16. 698 F.2d at 838. See generally Hoffman, supra note 8, at 116-22.
17. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 116.
18. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), wherein the
television broadcast of a 15-second "human cannonball" act without the consent of the per.
former was held to be a violation of the performer's right of publicity-
The broadcast... poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that per-
formance.... Much of its economic value lies in the 'right of exclusive control
over the publicity given to (the] performance." If the public can see the act free on
television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.
Id. at 573, 575-76.
19. Id at 575-76.
20. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 118.
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means.2 For instance, what qualifies as a "name"? What qualifies
as a "likeness"? The words are simple and few, but, as the re-
mainder of this note makes apparent, the interpretations given
them are varied and numerous.=
III
Expanding the Scope of the Right of Publicity
In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,'3 appellants
Johnny Carson and the apparel company with which he is associ-
ated brought suit against Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., for
use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" in their corporate name. Ap-
pellants alleged, inter alia, infringement of the right of
publicity.24
Appellant John W. Carson is the well-known host of "The To-
night Show," a talk-show program aired five nights a week by the
National Broadcasting Company. The phrase "Here's Johnny"
has been used to introduce Carson since he began hosting the
show in 1962. The phrase is spoken in a distinctive drawn-out
manner and has become associated with Carson by a large propor-
tion of television viewers. 5
The appellee, Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., is a Michi-
gan corporation which rents and sells portable toilets.26 Appel-
lee's founder admittedly used the phrase "Here's Johnny" in its
corporate name because of its association with "The Tonight
Show." He stated that he coupled the phrase "Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets" with the phrase "The World's Foremost Com-
modian" to make "a good play on a phrase. '
Although the district court dismissed the complaint,"8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. Compare Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (distinctive speaking
style protected) with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (no relief for imitation of singing style).
23. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
24. Appellants also alleged unfair competition, trademark infringement under federal
and state law, and infringement of the right of privacy.
25. 698 F.2d at 832-33.
26. Id at 833.
27. Id
28. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71 (1980). Regarding
the right of publicity and right of privacy theories, the trial court held that these rights,
extend only to a name or likeness. Additionally, "Here's Johnny" did not qualify on the
unfair competition claim, and the court concluded that appellants had failed to satisfy the
"likelihood of confusion" test.
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found for Carson on a right of publicity theory.29 The Sixth Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court's conception of the right of
publicity was too narrow, and held that the scope of the right is
not limited to the misappropriation of a "name" or "likeness," but
rather extends to any situation in which a celebrity's identity is
commercially exploited.' ° The appeals court relied on three cases
to support this conclusion: Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. ;31 Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc.;3 ' and Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.33
In Hirsch,' plaintiff-appellant Elroy Hirsch brought an action
for damages for the unauthorized use of his nickname,
"Crazylegs," on a shaving gel manufactured by defendant S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. Hirsch is a nationally known sports figure
who acquired the nickname "Crazylegs" while playing football at
the University of Wisconsin in 1942.1 The court took judicial no-
tice that as recently as June 24, 1979, Hirsch had been referred to
as "Crazylegs" in a Madison, Wisconsin newspaper.' Evidence
was submitted to show that Hirsch had a proprietary interest in
the nickname "Crazylegs"; he had made numerous commercials
and advertisements that used the nickname to identify him.3' The
court held that the fact the name "Crazylegs" was plaintiff's nick-
name and not plaintiff's actual name did not preclude a cause of
action under the right of publicity, but, rather, all that was re-
quired was a showing that the name clearly identified plaintiff.'
In Ali, 9 former heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali
brought an action for injunctive relief against Playgirl, Inc., for
allegedly printing, publishing, and distributing an objectionable
portrait of Ali in a magazine without authorization. The portrait
in question depicted a nude black man seated on a stool in the
corner of a boxing ring with both hands outstretched, resting on
29. Although other theories on which to award relief were advanced, this note is lim-
ited in scope to a discussion of the right of publicity. The court did not accept or reject the
claim of invasion of privacy. The court found that there was no trademark infringement.
698 F.2d at 834.
30. 698 F.2d at 835.
31. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
32. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.1978).
33. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
35. For a brief overview of Hirsch's athletic career, see id. at 384-85, 280 N.W.2d at 131.
36. I& at 384, 280 N.W.2d at 131.
37. Id. at 384-85, 280 N.W.2d at 131.
38. I& at 397, 280 N.W.2d at 137.
39. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
No. 2]
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the ropes on either side.40 The district court noted that "[e]ven a
cursory inspection of the picture. . . suggests that the facial char-
acteristics of the black male portrayed are those of Muhammad
Ali. The cheekbones, broad nose and wideset brown eyes, to-
gether with the distinctive smile and close cropped black hair, are
recognizable as the features of the plaintiff .. ."'I The picture,
captioned "Mystery Man," was accompanied by a verse which re-
ferred to the figure as "The Greatest." The court took judicial no-
tice that the plaintiff is regularly identified by the media and the
public as "The Greatest."' In granting a preliminary injunction,
the Ali court found that Ali had a proprietary interest in his "like-
ness" and that the unauthorized publication of a portrait unmis-
takably recognizable as the plaintiff amounted to a
misappropriation of that likeness. 4
3
In Motschenbacher," Lother Motschenbacher, a professional
driver of racing cars, sought injunctive relief and damages for the
alleged misappropriation of his name, likeness, personality, and
endorsement in a nationally televised cigarette commercial, under
a right of publicity theory.' As an internationally known race car
driver, Motschenbacher derived some of his income from manu-
facturers of commercial products who paid him for endorsing
their products. Motschenbacher consistently individualized his
cars to set them apart from the cars of other drivers. For instance,
his car bodies were uniformly red, and his car number "11" was
always placed against an oval background, as opposed to the circu-
lar background used on all other cars.' Defendant R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. produced a television commercial that utilized a stock
photograph of race cars on a racetrack. Motschenbacher's car ap-
peared in the foreground. Defendant altered the photograph as
follows: Motschenbacher's car number "11" was changed to "71," a
"spoiler" with the word "Winston" on it was attached to the car;
and all other advertisements were removed from the car. The
oval medallions bearing the racing car numbers and the red color
of the car were retained.47 In defendant's television commercial, a
message reading "Did you know Winston tastes good like a ciga-
40. Id at 726.
41. Id.
42. Id at 726-27.
43. Id at 728-29.
44. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
45. The advertisement was for "Winston" brand cigarettes.
46. 498 F.2d at 822.
47. I&
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rette should?" was made to appear to emanate from the altered
version of plaintiff's car." Plaintiff offered the affidavits of sev-
eral persons who had seen the commercial, recognized Mot-
schenbacher's car, and inferred that he was endorsing Winston
Cigarettes (cigarettes manufactured by defendant R.J. Reynolds
Company).49
On these facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant and af-
forded Motschenbacher protection under the right of publicity.' °
The court concluded that, although neither Motschenbacher's
name nor likeness was used in the commercial, he was neverthe-
less entitled to protection under the right of publicity since the
driver of the car was identifiable as plaintiff due to the distinctive
decorations on the vehicle.5'
Although the above cases may initially appear to support the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Carson, upon reflection it becomes evi-
dent that the Carson court's reliance on these cases was misplaced.
Hirsch simply stands for the proposition that a nickname can in
some instances qualify as a "name" and therefore receive protec-
tion under the right of publicity.5' The court in Hirsch did not
mention or discuss the treatment of descriptive phrases, such as
"Here's Johnny," which are merely associated with an individual.
In Ali, defendants virtually conceded that the artistic drawing in
Playgirl Magazine was a depiction of Muhammad Ali,53 and the
court therefore concluded that the drawing was a "likeness" of Ali
within the meaning of the right of publicity.' As in Hirsch, the
Ali court did not express any opinion as to whether phrases
merely associated with a person fall within the scope of the right
of publicity. Therefore, neither Ali nor Hirsch can be seen as ex-
tending the right of publicity to phrases associated with a person,
as was the situation in Carson.
At first glance, Motschenbacher and Carson appear to be similar
cases. In Motschenbacher, plaintiff sought protection under the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 821. The district court had characterized the action as one for invasion of
privacy. Id at 822.
51. Id. at 827.
52. 698 F.2d at 842-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The right of publicity has consistently
been interpreted as providing protection for celebrities' names. See supra note 2 and ac-
companying text.
53. 447 F. Supp. at 726 & n.7.
54. Id. at 729.
No. 2)
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right of publicity for the unauthorized use of one of his identifying
characteristics-his car. Likewise, in Carson, plaintiff sought pro-
tection for the unauthorized use of one of his identifying charac-
teristics-the phrase "Here's Johnny." A closer look, however,
uncovers some significant distinctions.
In Motschenbacher, defendant's use of a "Winston" spoiler on a
car identifiable as plaintiff's in a television commercial was injuri-
ous not only to plaintiff but also to the general television viewing
public.5 5 The plaintiff was economically injured, for, as he as-
serted, although part of his income as a race car driver was derived
from commercial endorsements, he was not remunerated at all by
defendant tobacco company for the television commercial. It is
conceivable that the commercial might deter other tobacco compa-
nies from legitimately seeking Motschenbacher's endorsement,
thereby depriving him of additional income. The television view-
ing public was also harmed because of the misleading nature of
the commercial; plaintiff had several affiants who had seen the
commercial and had inferred from it that plaintiff was endorsing
Winston cigarettes.'
In contrast, both the district court and the appeals court in Car-
son found no evidence that appellant had been damaged by appel-
lee's usage of the phrase.57 The Carson courts further found that
although the appellee had intentionally capitalized on the phrase
"Here's Johnny," he did not intend to deceive the public into be-
lieving Carson was connected with the product. And, in fact, the
courts found that there was little evidence of actual confusion.'
Thus, while both Motschenbacher and Carson are concerned with
an identifying characteristic, they are factually distinguishable
from one another and, hence, the Carson court's reliance on Mot-
schenbacher was misplaced.
The foregoing discussion indicates that there is a need for a new
method of analyzing right of publicity cases. There are currently
no consistent guidelines for our courts to follow when determining
the scope of the right of publicity.59 This lack of consistency is
unacceptable for two reasons. First, with such an unstructured
and unsystematic approach to determining the right of publicity,
an overbroad definition of the right of publicity may be adopted by
55. 498 F.2d at 822.
56. l
57. 698 F.2d at 834.
58. rd
59. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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our courts, as the Carson case illustrates. Such an occurrence is
clearly undesirable. If extended too far, the right'of publicity may
result in the impairment of precious first amendment freedoms.'
As one commentator so aptly stated, "One man's right is another
man's restraint . . . .""' That is, the additional rights that are
granted to one individual under an expansive right of publicity si-
multaneously represent additional limitations that must be placed
on the free speech rights of all other individuals in society. Such
limitations on guaranteed first amendment freedoms must not be
accepted casually. The ideal of free speech, if not the reality, is a
cornerstone of our national ethos.6' The public as a whole has im-
portant interests that are served by free and uninhibited expres-
sion,63 and that require vigorous safeguarding. At the very least,
set standards and criteria should be developed that will mandate
cautious enforcement and expansion of the right of publicity.
A second problem with the current, haphazard approach to ana-
lyzing right of publicity cases is that it has the effect of making a
court's decision very unpredictable. Unpredictability is less than
ideal in any area of law, but it has always been regarded as partic-
ularly undesirable when issues of free speech are concerned.6 "It
is generally held that First Amendment rights require 'breathing
space,' and uncertainty about the legal standards that control
these rights is regarded as having a 'chilling effect' on freedom of
expression." 65 The mere threat of sanctions may deter the exer-
cise of first amendment freedom as potently as the actual appro-
priation of sanctions.6
Reform is necessary. Well-defined standards for analyzing right
of publicity cases must be developed. Much can be borrowed from
the law of copyright.67
60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
61. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 112.
62. See A. MEIKLLJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
63. I&
64. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1592-96.
65. Id. at 1594; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1595.
67. Copyright is defined as "It]he exclusive privilege, by force of statute, of an author
or proprietor to print or otherwise multiply, publish, and vend copies of his literary, artis-
tic, or intellectual productions, and to license their production and sale by others during the
term of its existence." BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 272 (3d ed. 1969). Simply stated,
copyright means the right to copy.
No. 2]
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IV
Analogy to Copyright as a New Methodology
At the heart of both copyright law and the right of publicity is
an ongoing tension between two vital interests." On one side is
the interest in fostering our first amendment freedoms by oppos-
ing attempts of censorship.69 On the other side is the interest in
providing protection for the works of individuals so as to stimulate
creative endeavors.70
The law of copyright has effectively dealt with this conflict by
limiting the scope of copyright protection.7 1 First, copyright pro-
tection does not extend to an author's ideas per se; there is no re-
straint on the use of an idea or concept.72 Protection extends only
to the manner in which the ideas are expressed.7 This idea-ex-
pression dichotomy represents a workable balance between copy-
right and free speech interests.74 As one legal commentator noted:
68. See generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[A, at 62 (1983); Felcher &
Rubin, supra note 6; Hoffman, supra note 8. But see M. NIMMER, supra, § 1.10[A], at 63-64,
for a discussion of the view that copyright law falls within a built-in exception to the first
amendment.
69. See M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 1.10[B], at 1.70.1-1.72, for a review of policy justifi-
cations that underlie the freedom of speech.
70. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954):
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such crea-
tive activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Id. at 219. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977), the
Court stated that these same considerations underlie the right of publicity. See also Hoff-
man, supra note 8, at 116 (stating that allowing talented persons to reap the full reward of
their talents encourages creative efforts that benefit society).
71. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge The First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1981) ("In no case does copyright protection ... extend to any
idea."). See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (blank forms that merely record infor-
mation are ideas that are not copyrightable).
73. See M. NImmER, supra note 68, § 1.10[B], at 72 ('The market place of ideas would be
utterly bereft, and the democratic dialogue largely stifled, if the only ideas which might be
discussed were those original with the speakers.").
74. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980):
The idea/expression distinction, although an imprecise tool, has not been aban-
doned because we have as yet discovered no better way to reconcile the two com-
peting societal interests that provide the rationale for the granting of and the
restrictions on copyright protection: "rewarding an individual's ingenuity and ef-
fort while at the same time permitting the nation to benefit from further improve-
ments or progress resulting from others' use of the same subject matter."
Id. at 912. For a good discussion of the use of the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright,
see M. NIMME, supra note 68, § 1.10[B], at 76-77.
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In some degree it encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it
abridges the right to reproduce the "expression" of others, but this
is justified by the greater public good in the copyright encourage-
ment of creative works. In some degree it encroaches upon the
author's right to control his works in that it renders his "ideas"
per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the greater public need
for free access to ideas as part of the democratic dialogue.7 5
A second limitation on the scope of copyright is triggered when
there is a unity of idea and expression. When an idea is such that
it is capable of expression in only a limited number of ways, copy-
right law will limit the amount of protection given to any one ex-
pression. 6 This offer of limited protection is an attempt to
prevent an individual from receiving what in practice would
amount to the monopolization of an idea. Herbert Rosen Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian" is illustrative of the point. In that case, plain-
tiff sought copyright protection for a jeweled bee pin. In denying
protection, the court held that the similarity between plaintiff's
and defendant's pins was inevitable because the "expression" of a
jeweled bee pin contains nothing new over the "idea" of a jeweled
bee pin.7 s
A third limitation imposed on copyright is the requirement of
originality. To be "original," a work must be independently cre-
ated and not copied from other works.7 An author must put
something of himself or herself into the work. There appears to
be a "reciprocal relationship between creativity and independent
effort."'  This is not to say that a work must be creative to com-
mand copyright protection, but, rather, that the smaller the in-
dependent effort, the greater must be the degree of creativity in
order to claim copyright protection. In this regard, Judge Jerome
Frank, in Heim v. Universal. Pictures Co.,s l suggested that copy-
right protection would be granted to phrases such as "Euclid alone
has looked on Beauty bare"' 2 and "Twas brillig and the Slithy
75. M. NIMMER, supra note 68, § 1.10[B], at 76-77.
76. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168
(9th Cir. 1977) (the "scope of copyright protection increases with the extent expression
differs from the idea"). See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st
Cir. 1967) (contest rules were held uncopyrightable because its subject matter permitted "if
not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number"). See invfr note 92 and
accompanying text.
77. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 739.
79. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
80. M. NiMMER, supra note 68, § 2.01[B). at 15.
81. 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
82. 154 F.2d at 487 n.8.
No. 2]
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Toves." 11
Finally, all copyrighted works are subject to the fair use doc-
trine.8 4 This doctrine provides a defense to a copyright infringe-
ment action. A court will excuse the unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work if the use is deemed "fair." In determining
whether the use of a work is fair, a court will consider such factors
as: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
protected work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
the protected work. This list is not exhaustive,"M and a finding on
any particular factor is not determinative; fair use is an equitable
doctrine which is necessarily defined on a case by case basis."M
The limitations above are built into the laws of copyright. By
narrowing the scope of protection, these limitations effectively
preserve the interests of copyright without encroaching upon the
fundamental principles of the first amendment.8 7
The right of publicity is similar to the law of copyright in that it
is faced with the same competing interests: a desire to encourage
creative efforts of individuals by providing economic incentives,
and a desire to safeguard first amendment freedoms."s Unlike the
law of copyright, however, the right of publicity has yet to strike a
compatible balance among the competing interests. Such a bal-
ance can be achieved if the copyright limitations discussed above
are applied to the right of publicity. When determining how far
the right of publicity should extend-what attributes and charac-
teristics will receive protection-a court should consider the idea/
expression dichotomy; whether there is a unity in idea and expres-
sion; how original the work is; and whether in the particular case
it is equitable to grant protection. 9 By utilizing this framework, a
court can foster the goals underlying the right of publicity without
running afoul of the first amendment.
83. 1d
84. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1981). For a more complete discussion of the fair use doctrine, see
N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAw 117-30 (1981).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1981).
86. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976).
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
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A New Method in Action
The decision in Carson to extend the scope of the right of pub-
licity to protect the phrase "Here's Johnny" is questionable when
viewed in light of the suggested approach.
The phrase "Here's Johnny" is an example of an idea and an
expression which are only marginally distinguishable. It is analo-
gous to the jeweled bee pin example previously discussed.' There
is almost complete unity of idea and expression; the expression of
"Here's Johnny" contains little, if anything, new over the idea of
introducing a person. When one considers the limited number of
ways that an introduction can be expressed, the danger of granting
a monopoly on such an expression becomes apparent. If the ex-
pression is simple and ordinary, granting a monopoly on its use
would be akin to granting a monopoly on the very idea of using
introductory phrases. In Morrissey v. The Proctor and Gamble
Co.9' the court recognized this danger when it held that simple
contest rules are uncopyrightable:
[When] the topic necessarily requires [it be limited to] if not only
one form of expression, at best [to] only a limited number, to per-
mit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyright-
ing a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of
future use of the substance. In such circumstances ... it is neces-
sary to say that the subject matter would be appropriated by per-
mitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize
copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be
checkmated.92
In addition to the problem of the merging of idea and expres-
sion, there is a problem with the quantum of originality in the
phrase "Here's Johnny." As the dissent in Carson noted, the
phrase "Here's Johnny" is a "common, simple combination of a
direct object, a contracted verb and a common first name; divorced
from context, it is two dimensional and ambiguous.""3 A greater
amount of creativity, i.e., originality, seems necessary to justify
granting a monopoly on the expression. The phrase is distinguish-
able from identifying characteristics such as the race car in Mot-
schenbacher, as the number and the various decorations on
Motschenbacher's car were "unique enough to resist duplication
90. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
91. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
92. Id at 678-79.
93. 698 F.2d at 844.
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other than by intentional copying.""
Finally, even if the hurdles of unity of idea and expression and
quantum of originality can be overcome, the issue of fair use re-
mains. Taking into account factors such as the purpose and char-
acter of defendant's use, the nature of the work itself, the amount
and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market for the protected work, the court must
determine the overall reasonableness of defendant's conduct.
The district court in Carson found that the defendant did not
intend to deceive the public in any way and that there was little
evidence of any confusion. The court also found no evidence that
appellee's use of the phrase damaged appellants.9 5 It is true that
appellants in Carson might receive additional income by selling
the rights to the phrase "Here's Johnny," but, as one legal com-
mentator explained:
[C]elebrities are compensated for the activities that generate their
publicity values in the first place. To the extent this compensation
provides them an adequate rate of return on the time and effort
they have invested in their human capital, less weight need be ac-
corded their individual interests in reaping additional remunera-
tion for collateral uses of their names and likenesses ....
Rewards accruing from collateral uses of their names and like-
nesses may be more like proverbial icing on the cake .... For the
most part it is the Elvis Presleys, the Bela Lugosis, the Agatha
Christies of the world who benefit from the right of publicity-
and these are precisely the persons whose income would be more
than adequate even if publicity rights were nonexistent.
96
Consideration of the above factors reveals that appellee's use of
the phrase "Here's Johnny" was a fair use and thus beyond the
reach of appellant Carson's right of publicity.
94. 1l
95. See supra notes 48-49, 57-58, and accompanying text. It is worth noting that, in
contrast to Carson, defendant's acts in All and Motschenbacher at best confused the viewing
public and at worst deceived them. An individual viewing the portrait in Playgirl is certain
to recognize the likeness to All, just as a television viewer watching the Winston commer-
cial is likely to notice the peculiar features on the racing car pictured, mistake the number
"71" for an "11," and assume that Motschenbacher is endorsing Winston cigarettes. Also,
plaintiffs in Hirsch and Motschenbacher were directly affected by defendant's actions. Both
plaintiffs normally receive income from the very activity that was the subject of their
complaint.
96. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 119-20.
[Vol. 7
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
VI
Conclusion
The courts currently have no consistent method of analysis for
determining how far the right of publicity extends. As a result,
there is much confusion and inconsistency in their decisions. This
confusion jeopardizes our first amendment freedoms by increasing
the likelihood that an overbroad definition of the right of publicity
will be adopted by the courts.
Reform is necessary. A cohesive method of analysis must be de-
veloped and adhered to by the courts. Set criteria must be estab-
lished that adequately balance the interests in both the right of
publicity and the first amendment. As suggested, much can be
borrowed from the law of copyright. The idea/expression dichot-
omy, originality requirement, and fair use doctrine are three prin-
ciples of copyright law which can be applied effectively to the
right of publicity. But what is of central importance is not that
any one method in particular be adopted, but rather that some
method be adopted. The stakes are high.
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